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MUNICIPAL ANTIFRAUD LIABILITY
UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAWS UPON ISSUANCE OF
TAX-EXEMPT INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT BONDS
JON R. TANDLER *
Traditionally characterized as sound investments,1 municipal bond
issues increasingly are experiencing defaults.2 One cause of these
bond defaults, borrower insolvency, frequently results from the is-
suer's misrepresentation about the borrower's financial position.3
* B.S., Indiana University, 1979; J.D., Washington University, 1982.
1. Speer, **at Every Lawyer Should Know About Municioal Bonds, 44 ILL. B.J.
146, 147 (1955) (municipal bonds rank second only to United States Government
Bonds for security). Accord Peacock, A Review of Munic#7al Securities and their Status
Under the Federal Securities Laws as Amended by the Securities Acts Amendments of
1975, 31 Bus. LAW. 2037, 2038 (1976); Schwarz, Municipal Bonds and the Securities
Laws: Do Investors Have an Implied Private Remedy?, 7 SEC. REG. L.J. 119, 123
(1979).
2. See, e.g., Bradford Sec. Processing Servs., Inc. v. County Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 474 F. Supp. 957, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (fraud by bond salesman before indus-
trial development bond default); Scarfotti v. Bache & Co., 438 F. Supp. 199, 201
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (private corporation default on industrial development bond debt
service). See also Doty & Petersen, The Federal Securities Laws and Transactions in
Municial Securities, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 283, 329-33 (1976) (comparison of municipal
and corporate defaults). See generally ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL RELATIONS, CITY FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES: THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
DIMENSION 9-30 (1973) (discussion of past municipal bond defaults).
3. Eg., In re New York Mun. Sec. Litig., [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
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Tax-exempt industrial development bonds (IDB's),4 similarly abused
by parties to an IDB offering,5 also experience delinquencies.' Given
the current industrial development bond "mini-boom," 7 municipal
issuers should assess their potential liability for IDB default under
the federal antifraud securities laws.' This Note examines the securi-
Rep., (CCH) 97,258 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (action by bond purchasers against New York
City officials, banks and underwriting firms because of city's near financial collapse).
See Casey & Smith, A New Look at Municipal Bonds-Disclosure Responsibilities in
the Municipal Bond Market, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 639 (1976). But see Sykes, Civil
Liability of Public Officers Under Federal Securities Statutesfor Municpal Bond Mis-
representations, 2 URn. LAW. 219, 220 (1970) (misrepresentations by officials rarely
occur).
4. The typical industrial development bond finances a municipality's purchase or
construction of capital improvements for use by private enterprise. The governmental
issuer leases the facility to a corporate borrower, which forwards lease payments to a
trustee. The trustee disburses bond proceeds to facilitate construction and to finance
the borrower's operations. The borrower's lease payments reduce outstanding bond
principal and interest. A mortgage on the underlying real property secures the bond.
Municipalities normally do not back an IDB with their full faith and credit or taxing
authority. In many instances the issuer disclaims liability for borrower default and
only oversees the trustee's management of cash flow. Upon expiration of the lease,
the lessee may renew the lease or purchase the facility for a nominal sum. Otherwise,
the facility reverts to the municipality. See Greenberg, Municipal Securities.- Some
Basic Principles and Practices, 9 URn. LAW. 338, 344 (1977). See also Abbey, Munici-
pal Industrial Development Bonds, 19 VAND. L. REV. 25, 26 (1965).
A community and a corporation utilizing this financing method receive several
benefits. An increased tax base enables the community to expand governmental serv-
ices. The newly located company stimulates local employment and business invest-
ment. See S. BUCHER, IMPACT OF NEw INDUSTRIAL PLANTS: EIGHT CASE STUDIES
2 (1971). Because industrial development bonds are tax exempt, the corporate bor-
rower benefits from the decrease in the cost of capital. See generally Note, The Impor-
tance ofAssessing Business Transactionsfor their Impact Upon the Tax-Exempt Status
of Industrial Redevelopment Bonds, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 705 (1979).
5. The parties principally involved with an industrial development bond offering
are the borrower, the municipal issuer, the bond and corporate counsel, the project
analyst, the underwriter (sometimes also acting as broker) and the bond trustee.
KUTAK, ROCK & HuIE, RESOURCE MATERIALS FOR THE FUNDAMENTALS OF PUBLIC
FINANCE 4 (1981).
6. E.g., Bradford Sec. Processing Servs v. County Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 474 F.
Supp. 957, 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (securities brokerage and bond trustee failed to inves-
tigate and disclose IDB trading scheme by bond salesman); Franke v. Midwestern
Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (bond counsel omitted mate-
rial facts in preparation of IDB legality opinion); SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F.
Supp. 866, 872 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (bond salesmen duped veterans by misrepresentation
and bond substitution).
7. Address by Richard L Weill to the Public Securities Association, on The Mini-
Boom in Industrial Development Bonds (Oct. 23, 1980).
8. Doty & Petersen, supra note 2, at 377. Although experts debate the question of
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ties and tax implications of an IDB issuance. It then analyzes the
constitutionality of municipal liability and the possible antifraud vio-
lations by a municipal issuer. Finally, it explores measures to reduce
municipal liability and to strengthen the security of industrial devel-
opment bonds.
I. THE SETrING
States and their political subdivisions frequently attempt to en-
courage economic growth and industrial concentration within their
borders. 9 Industrial development bonds provide one means of en-
couraging industrial growth."0 Although municipalities accrue eco-
nomic benefits from IDB issuances,II they rarely back the bond with
full faith and credit or taxing authority.12 Instead, municipal dis-
claimers for any type of liability arising from an issuance are the
norm. 3 In spite of this practice, municipal issuers may be subject to
antifraud liability under certain circumstances. 4 The Securities Act
whether sovereign immunity protects municipal government and its officials from in-
vestor suit, several commentators believe that it does not. See, e.g., Borge, Municipal
Securities Offerings and the Needfor Voluntary and Responsible Disclosures, 3 CuR-
RENT MUN. PROBS. 146 (1976). See infra notes 46-68 and accompanying text.
9. Note, Legal Limitations on Public Inducements to Industrial Location, 59
COLUM. L. REv. 618, 623 (1959). See GOODBODY & CO., INDUSTRIAL AID FINANC-
ING 1 (1st ed. 1965).
10. From 1975 to 1980, small issue IDB sales increased over six-fold.
Small Issue Industrial Development Bond Sales
(in Thousands)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
$1,343.3 $1,538.1 $2,282.6 $3,528.5 $7,140.0 $8,439.9
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, SMALL ISSUE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BONDS
71(1981).
Many small 1DB issues are placed privately and not reported to the Congressional
Budget Office. The above figures are therefore estimated. Id. at 13.
11. GOODBODY & Co., supra note 9, at 39-40. See supra note 4.
12. If a municipality guaranteed an IDB with its full faith and credit, it would
ultimately be accountable to aggrieved purchasers. See Address by SEC Commis-
sioner Karmel, Legislative Proposals Regarding IDB's, [hereinafter cited as Karmel
Address] reprinted in 182 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE: MUNICIPAL BONDS 227, 230
(1980). Cf. Abbey, supra note 4, at 26 (some municipalities do back IDB's with their
full faith and credit.
13. E.g., Scarfotti v. Bache & Co., 438 F. Supp. 199, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (the
bond certificates patently disclaimed liability of the issuing authority and the state of
New York). See Greenberg, supra note 4, at 344.
14. See infra notes 69-123 and accompanying text.
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of 1933 (1933 Act),15 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Ex-
change Act),16 and their interplay with Internal Revenue Code (IRC)
section 10317 delineate the legal status of an IDB issuer.
II. THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS AND INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE SECTION 103
Municipal securities, under section 3(a) of the 1933 Act 18 and sec-
tion 3(a)(12) of the 1934 Exchange Act, 19 are exempt from the regis-
tration and reporting requirements of the federal securities laws.20
Prior to 1975, "persons" subject to the 1934 Exchange Act's an-
tifraud provisions, section 10(b)2 and rule lOb-5,22 did not include
municipalities.2 3 Although section 2(2) of the 1933 Act24 includes
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1976).
17. I.R.C. § 103 (1976).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (1976).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1976).
20. Note, Securities Regulation: The Liability of Municpalities for State and Fed-
eral Securities Fraud in the Issuance of Industrial Development Bonds, 30 OKLA. L.
REv. 704,712 (1977). Municipal officials, because of the enormous underwriting fees
registration entails, actively lobbied Congress for the exemption. See Landis, The
Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 39 (1959).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange-
(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase of sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange,
a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1976).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2) (1976).
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municipalities within the definition of "persons" liable for fraudulent
securities transactions, courts disallow private actions brought under
section 17(a), 25 of the 1933 antifraud Act.26
Woods v. Homes and Structures of Pittsburgh27 illustrates the di-
lemma these provisions presented to aggrieved IDB investors. In
Woods, the city of Pittsburgh, Kansas issued an IDB for the benefit
of Homes and Structures. 28 The IDB was issued prior to the 1975
Exchange Act amendments, which rendered municipalities subject to
antifraud liability. Approximately one year after bond distribution,
Homes and Structures defaulted on its debt and lease payment obli-
gations.29 Because the corporate guarantors had vanished,3° the in-
vestors sought relief against Pittsburgh under sections 10(b), 17(a)
and rule lOb-5. 31 The Woods court dismissed the section 10(b) and
rule lob-5 claims, because Pittsburgh was not a "person" subject to
1934 Exchange Act antifraud liability.3 2 The court also barred the
25. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(l) (1976). Section 17(a) employs language similar to section
10(b) and rule lOb-5, covering purchases and sales. Section 17(a), however, broadens
its scope to security "offers." Id.
26. The denial of the section 17(a) private right of action is premised on the provi-
sion for such an action in sections I 1 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act. These latter sections
are broad enough in scope to cover any violation under 17(a). Reid v. Mann, 381 F.
Supp. 525, 526 (N.D. Ill. 1974). See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833,
867 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (corporation and its officers subject to antifraud liability
for illegal trading on information about an undisclosed ore discovery), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969). See also McFarland v. Memorex, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,368 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (no implied remedy provided). Contra
Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 99 (4th Cir. 1975) (implied remedy provided). The
majority view maintains that section 17(a) provides for only injunctive relief, or upon
a showing of fraudulent intent, criminal liability. Landis, Liability Sections of Securi-
ties Act, 18 AM. AccT. 330, 331 (1933).
27. 489 F. Supp. 1270 (D. Kan. 1980).
28. Id. at 1276. The revenue from the bond was to be used to construct a manu-
facturing facility in Pittsburgh. Homes and Structures leased the facility to build
modular home components. The revenue from the lease of the land and the facility
was to be used to pay the interest and principal to the bondholders. Id.
29. Id. at 1277.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1282. The Woods court followed an analysis of the 1934 Exchange Act
legislative history by Judge Owen. See In re New York City Mun. Sec. Litig., [1980
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,258 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (suit against city
officials for not disclosing New York's precarious financial position upon issuance of
general obligation bonds). See also Greenspan v. Crosbie, [1976 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,780 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (dismissal of suit by purchaser of
1983]
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section 17(a) cause of action, holding that private relief was unavaila-
ble thereunder.33
Because of widespread industrial development bond use,34 in 1968
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated rules
131 and 3b-5 under the 1933 and 1934 acts, respectively.35 These
rules identified IDB's as "separate securities," subject to the registra-
tion and reporting provisions of the securities laws.36 In 1970, Con-
gress rejected this extreme method of antifraud prevention 37 by
amending section 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act and section 3(a)(12) of the
1934 Exchange Act.38 The amendments provide that tax-exempt in-
dustrial development bonds, meeting the requirements of IRC sec-
tion 103,39 are exempt from SEC registration and reporting.40
IRC section 103 excludes from a taxpayer's gross income any inter-
corporate stock against the Providence of Newfoundland and Labrador and its gov-
ernment officials).
33. 489 F. Supp. at 1284-88.
34. Public industrial development bond sales rose from $504.5 million in 1966 to
$1.56 billion in 1968. See THE BOND BUYER'S MUNICIPAL FINANCE STATISTICs, THE
DAILY BOND BUYER (1979) [hereinafter cited as BOND BUYER].
35. Securities Act Release No. 4921 and Exchange Act Release No. 8388, [1968
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,592 (1968). The full text of Rule 131
can be found at 17 C.F.R. § 230.131 (1981). The full text of Rule 3b-5 can be found
at 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-5 (1982).
36. Id See also Note, Munic4pal Bonds-The Needfor Disclosure, 78 W. VA. L.
REv. 391, 394 (1976).
37. A sharp decrease in IDB financing apparently prompted Congress to act. Al-
though 1968 public placements totaled $1.56 billion, 1969 sales dropped to $24 mil-
lion. BOND BUYER, supra note 34.
38. The amended acts were codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1976) and 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(12) (1976).
39. I.R.C. § 103 (1976) provides in part:
2) Industrial development bond
For purposes of this subsection the term "industrial development bond" means
any obligation-
A) which is issued as part of an issue all or a major portion of the proceeds of
which are to used directly or indirectly in any trade or business carried on by any
person who is not an exempt person (within the meaning of paragraph (3)), and
B) the payment of the principal or interest on which (under the terms of such
obligation or any underlying arrangement) is, in whole or in major part-
i) secured by any interest in property used or to be used in a trade or business
or in payments in respect of such property, or
ii) to be derived from payments in respect of property, or borrowed money,
used or to be used in a trade or business.
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(a)(2), 78c(a)(12) (1976).
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est received from federal, state and municipal obligations. It also ex-
empts interest from industrial development bonds that finance
community projects such as family housing, sports and convention
halls, transportation and utility and pollution control outlets. Section
103(b)(5) additionally exempts IDB issues of less than $1 million; $10
million at the election of the issuer with Treasury Department au-
thorization. Hence, IRC section 103 and the securities laws' indus-
trial development bond provisions create an inescapable interplay
between the tax and securities law provisions. 4
The 1975 amendments to the securities laws revised section 3(a)(9)
of the 1934 Exchange Act42 to designate "government and political
subdivisions" as "persons" subject to antifraud liability under section
10(b) and rule lOb-5. 43 Therefore, although IDB's are exempt from
registration requirements,' bonds issued after the 1975 amendments
expose the municipality to private actions under section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5.45
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
In recent municipal securities fraud proceedings, several tribunals
discussed whether the tenth amendment46 prohibits Congress from
imposing antifraud liability upon municipal bond issuers.47  The
41. For an excellent analysis of the section 103 effect on business decisions utiliz-
ing IDB's, see Note, supra note 4. See also Note, supra note 20, at 713-14.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1976).
43. The 1975 amendments were designed to prevent fraud and misrepresentation
in the entire municipal securities industry. Municipal issuers are regulated indirectly
through the creation of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and the
Municipal Finance Officers' Association (MFOA). The MSRB regulates municipal
securities dealers while the MFOA guidelines suggest methods of disclosure for reve-
nue bond issuers. See Dikeman, Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board- A New Con-
cept of Self-Regulation, 29 VAND. L. REV. 903 (1976); Doty & Petersen, supra note 2,
at 5.
44. The MSRB is not empowered to require registration of municipal security
offerings before their sale. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d)(l)-(2) (Supp. V 1975). Some com-
mentators believe, however, that the SEC, under the 1975 amendments, may require
certain disclosures after the sale. Doty & Petersen, supra note 2, at 300.
45. Eg., Woods v. Homes and Structures, 489 F. Supp. 1270 (D. Kan. 1980). In
Woods, section 10(b) and rule lob-5 relief was denied because the IDB was issued
prior to 1975. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
46. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
47. Eg., City of New York v. SEC, [1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
1983]
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Supreme Court's most definitive statement of municipal powers
under the tenth amendment,48 National League of Cities v. Usery,49
provides guidance on this question.
In National League of Cities, the Court invalidated the extension of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and its minimum wage and
hour provisions to state employees." The Court, balancing the im-
portance of the provisions and their potential adverse effect on mu-
nicipal budgets, held that the FLSA amendments interfered with the
states' ability to furnish traditional"1 and essential government
52services.
The rationale of this tenth amendment holding was thereafter ex-
tended to the municipal securities context5 3 in Philadelphia v. SEC.5 4
In an attempt to enjoin an SEC investigation, Philadelphia officials
relied on National League of Cities, arguing that the SEC's presence
would erode investor confidence. 5 This would raise the city's bor-
rowing cost and impair the delivery of governmental services.56 The
Philadelphia court rejected the city's argument by reasoning that a
preliminary investigation would not displace state services and would
(CCH) 95,667 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (declaratory judgment action for a determination
that SEC intervention violated tenth amendment). See also Note, Federal Regulation
of Municial Securities: A Constitutional and Statutory Analysis, 76 DUKE L.J. 1261,
1312 (1976).
48. Brady, The Constitutional Limitations Upon Federal Regulation of Munici-
pal Issuers, 51 ST. JoHN's L. Rnv. 565, 574 (1977).
49. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
50. Id. at 852.
51. Id. at 845.
52. Id. The Court noted the severe strain that the FLSA wage and hour require-
ments placed on state budgets. These requirements forced the plaintiffs to curtail
affirmative action police training programs and other governmental services. Id. at
846-47.
The Court distinguished Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), which upheld
the Nixon Administration's wage and price freeze. Fry, according to the Court, in-
volved an emergency measure operating temporarily only. 426 U.S. at 852. The
freeze did not displace state functions and, in fact, reduced state fiscal pressures. Id.
at 853.
53. City of New York v. SEC, [1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,667 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) first raised this issue. See supra note 47 and accompanying
text. It does not appear that there was a final disposition of the tenth amendment
question.
54. 434 F. Supp. 281 (E.D. Pa. 1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 1003 (1978).
55. 434 F. Supp. at 283, 287.
56. Id. at 283.
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not create the interference that city official feared. 7 Although the
Philadelphia court did not address the "balancing approach" dis-
cussed in National League of Cities,58 the federal interest in investor
protection apparently superseded the minimal displacement of city
functions.5 9
An industrial development bond issuance presents an additional
argument against municipal immunity. By issuing an IDB, the mu-
nicipality necessarily acts within a proprietary scope.60 Municipal
engagement in private enterprise, according to several high court de-
616
cisions, removes any sovereign immunity claim.62  In Woods v.
Homes and Structures of Pittsburgh,63 the city of Pittsburgh, in its
defense against fraud claimed immunity under the tenth amendment
and the holding of National League of Cities.' The Woods court
denied immunity, emphasizing that the corporation, rather than the
city, received the primary benefits of the IDB.65 Furthermore, the
court found that antifraud enforcement would not displace city serv-
ices,6 6 and providing corporate capital was not a traditional govern-
mental function.67
The Woods approach contains four tiers, each representing a bar to
57. Id. at 288. The Philadelphia court read National League of Cities as striking
down federal law that usurped areas traditionally regulated by the states. Id. at 287.
For support of this view, see Brady, supra note 48, at 574.
58. 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun stated that fed-
eral legislation should mandate state compliance only when the federal government
has a comparatively predominant interest. Id.
59, 434 F. Supp. at 288.
60. See Note, Municipal Bonds and the Federal Securities Laws: The Results of
Forty Years of Indirect Regulation, 28 VAND. L. REV. 561, 564 (1975). See also
Greenberg, supra note 4, at 344.
61. E.g., New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (state sales of mineral
water not exempt from 1932 Revenue Act); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175
(1936) (Federal Safety Appliance Act applicable to state-operated railway); South
Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905) (upheld federal license tax on state-
established liquor dispensaries).
62. Brady, supra note 48, at 588.
63. 489 F. Supp. 1270 (D. Kan. 1980). See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying
text.
64. 489 F. Supp. at 1296.
65. Id. at 1297.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1296. The Woods court also relied on Amersbach v. City of Cleveland,
598 F.2d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir. 1979), to define characteristics of public functions.
Amersbach maintains that community benefit, public service and the role of the gov-
19831
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the municipal claim of tenth amendment immunity. First, IDB's are
proprietary in nature. Second, relief for defrauded investors does not
interfere with city functions. Third, issuing an IDB is not an essential
government activity. Fourth, investor protection is paramount.68 A
constitutional defense based upon the tenth amendment, therefore,
will not protect a municipality charged with liability arising from an
IDB issuance.
IV. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS
ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS
An aggrieved industrial development bond investor who possesses
substantive evidence of issuer fraud or misrepresentation may seek
relief against the municipality as a principal perpetrator or as an
aider and abettor.69 Additionally, he may attempt to posit a remedy
upon the agency principle of respondeat superior.7 °
A. Liability of the Issuer as a Principal
An IDB purchaser who relies on the municipality's false or mis-
leading representations about the bond issuance may seek relief
against the municipality under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.7 The
first judicial response to the issue of municipal liability for securities
fraud was Thiele v. Shields. 2
ernment as the instigator and most capable body to furnish the service, are the pri-
mary characteristics of public functions. 598 F.2d at 1037.
68. 489 F. Supp. at 1296-97. The Woods court also noted that municipal adher-
ence to the antifraud laws would benefit bond purchasers and the city's work force,
who might be employees of the corporate borrower. Id. at 1297.
69. See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978)
(aider and abettor theory used to find brokerage firms liable for factual misrepresen-
tation by an employee). The same theory could be applied to municipalities that do
not verify the information supplied by the bond counsel. See infra notes 80-104 and
accompanying text.
70. See Weill, Securities Laws Issues in Industrial Development and Pollution Con-
trolFinancing in 113 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE: INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND
POLLUTION CONTROL FINANCING 502, 510 (1977).
71. Although the SEC frequently learns about insolvencies of IDB financed enter-
prises, Karmel Address, supra note 12, at 240, no plaintiff has successfully attacked a
municipality for fraudulent conduct in connection with an industrial development
bond issuance. Note, supra note 20, at 718. See also Sykes, supra note 3, at 219.
72. 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The Shields litigation encompassed six
suits, none of which made a final determination on the merits. E.g., International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Shields & Co., 209 F. Supp. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
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In Thiele, plaintiffs, who purchased Bellevue, Nebraska Bridge
Commission bonds, accused the Commission of fraudulently misrep-
resenting the estimated vehicular traffic in the bond-offering
brochure.73 Judge Kaufman, for the Thiele court, swept aside the no-
tion that municipal officials fell outside the scope of "persons" sub-
ject to the provisions of sections 10(b) and 17(a).74 He recognized,
however, the municipal exemption from section 12(2) of the 1933
Act. 75 He also noted that section 12(2) imposed antifraud liability
unless the security offeror could prove that the misrepresentation was
negligent, rather than intentional.76 Finally, Judge Kaufman ob-
served that negligent misrepresentations were not expressly pro-
scribed by sections 17(a) and 10(b).7 7 Given the section 12(2)
negligence defense, he held that municipal officials were not culpable
unless plaintiffs proved an "intentional or knowing"
misrepresentation.78
In order to obtain relief against the issuer as principal under sec-
tion 10(b) and rule lOb-5, the defrauded IDB investor must demon-
strate that the municipality, intentionally perpetrated a fraud, either
orally, in an offering circular, or in written advertisements. Under
1Ob-5 any intentional omission of this kind will render the municipal-
ity liable.79
B. The Municipality as an Aider and Abettor
Bond counsel, the underwriter, the broker-dealer, the bond trustee,
the corporate borrower and the municipal issuer are indispensable
Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Greenwhich Say. Bank v.
Shields, 131 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Baron v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 370
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 363
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); Citizens Casualty Co. v. Shields, [1952-1956 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,683 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
73. 131 F. Supp. at 417.
74. Id. at 419-20. Judge Kaufman noted that Congress intended to hold liable
municipal officers who intentionally misrepresented a fact about a bond, even though
municipal officials are not liable for failure to prove that they exercised reasonable
care in investigating the truth of a representation. Id.
75. Id. at 419.
76. Id See 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
77. 131 F. Supp. at 419.
78. Id. at 420.
79. See generally Doty & Petersen, supra note 2, at 368.
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parties to an IDB issuance.80 After a determination of project feasi-
bility, each party benefits from bond distribution.8 ' The dealer earns
sales commissions. The borrower, in many instances, depends on the
bond to finance delayed capital expenditures for initial projects of
operational improvements.82 The municipality desires to attract or
maintain the borrower's operation, to accrue tax revenue and to in-
crease local employment.83 The remaining parties receive their fees
directly from bond proceeds.' These motives, individually or in the
aggregate, might lead to placement of bond issues through false or
misleading statements. As is commonly done in other securities
fraud litigation,8" a defrauded purchaser suing a principal perpetra-
tor may join the IDB issuer as an aider and abettor.8 6 Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Insurance Co. 87 illustrates the liability courts
80. KUTAK, ROCK & HUE, RESOURCE MATERIALS FOR THE FUNDAMENTALS OF
PUBLIC FINANCE 4 (1981).
81. Interview with spokesman from Goldman, Sachs & Co., in St. Louis, Missouri
(Feb. 12, 1981). The determination of project feasibility alone requires large expendi-
tures to determine if financial, architectural, operational and market projections are
accurate. Interview with the Executive Director of the St. Louis County Development
Authority, in St. Louis, Missouri (Sept. 23, 1981).
82. Interview with the Executive Director of the St. Louis County Development
Authority, in St. Louis, Missouri (Sept. 23, 1981).
83. GOODBODY & Co., supra note 9, at 39-40.
84. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13 (1979). These fees are defined as "issuing expenses."
Id.
85. Eg., In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 161, 179-80
(C.D. Cal. 1976) (insurance company fraud by falsely reporting earnings growth to
raise stock trading prices); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21, 28
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) (aiding and abetting culpability particularly proper where defend-
ants owe special duty to plaintiffs); SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 43 (N.D.
Cal. 1939) (injunction is one remedy for aiding and abetting securities law violation).
See Ruder, Multille Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases:. Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, IndemntFcation and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597
(1972).
86. One definition of "aider and abettor" is generally used in criminal proceed-
ings. "Whoever aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures the commission
of a crime is punishable as a principal. In order to aid or abet the commission of a
crime a person must associate himself with the criminal venture, participate in it, and
try to make it succeed." SEVENTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON
JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES, MANUAL ON JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES, pub//shed in 33 F.R.D. 523, 544 (1963). Al-
though this definition refers to criminal activity, the concept can apply in civil or
criminal securities fraud litigation.
87. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), ajJ'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
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place upon aiders and abettors in the securities fraud context.
In Brennan, plaintiffs alleged that Midwestern's officers and direc-
tors, with intent to profit personally, aided and abetted a brokerage
firm by concealing the firm's improper activities.88 The Brennan
court stated that section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 could render the de-
fendants culpable if Midwestern possessed knowledge by virtue of a
"special relationship" with its investors, which resulted in a duty to
disclose.8 9 The Supreme Court took the Brennan decision9° one step
further. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder9t the Court decided what
standard of intent section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 required to attach aid-
ing and abetting culpability.
In Hochfelder, plaintiffs alleged that Ernst & Ernst, a public ac-
counting firm, aided and abetted a fraud perpetrated by a brokerage
firm's president.92 Plaintiffs premised their argument on defendant's
improper audits of the brokerage firm.93 The Hochfelder court held
that section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 liability required the plaintiff prove
defendant's "scienter," and not merely negligent conduct.94 The
Supreme Court refrained, however, from deciding whether "reckless"
conduct could result in liability under these provisions.95 At least
one court has since implied that proof of recklessness would suffice.9 6
88. 259 F. Supp. at 675.
89. Id. at 681-82. In the securities trading context, the Supreme Court further
defined a duty to disclose under section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5. This duty, according to
the Court, arises because of a "fiduciary or similar relation of trust." Chiarella v.
United States. 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980). See generally Comment, Duty to Disclose
Inside Information Arises from a Fiduciary or Special Relation between Parties to a
Securities Transaction, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 1013 (1980).
90, Commentators disagree on whether Brennan requires the defendant aider and
abettor to receive a personal benefit as a prerequisite to liability. Note, supra note 20,
at 721-22, supports the requirement of a personal benefit because the Brennan defend-
ants profited from their fraud through increased stock sales. But see Ruder, supra
note 85, at 628. Adoption of the first position, in the IDB context, would require the
plaintiff to allege facts which prove the municipality's profit.
91. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
92. Id. at 190.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 205. The Court, strictly construing the 10(b) and lob-5 language, stated
that these provisions required a mental state embracing an intent to deceive or de-
fraud. Id. at 194 n.12.
95. Id. at 214.
96. See, e.g., In re Clinton Oil Co. Sec. Litig., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,015 (D. Kan. 1977) (the board of directors' reckless disregard
of the shareholder interests would meet the Hochfelder standard).
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It is inconsistent to predicate corporate liability upon a standard of
"scienter" '97 while imposing municipal liability upon a standard of
recklessness. 98 Both entities owe integrity and probing inquiry to the
investing public. The corporation and its officials, however, normally
possess greater expertise in the financial area than municipalities
do.99 Furthermore, corporate officers are the actual financial transac-
tors, while municipal officials are essentially aligned with those re-
ceiving the most direct benefit from the IDB issuance.'0°
Under Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance1 ' an IDB
purchaser must additionally demonstrate the issuer's knowledge of
the principal's fraudulent activity and affirmative concealment when
a duty to disclose exists."°2 Additionally, under Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,1°3 section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 liability will attach on a
municipal aider and abettor only upon proof of intent to defraud."°4
C. Municipal Liability on a Respondeat Superior Theory
Principal liability of a party to an IDB issuance is arguably imput-
able to a municipality." 5 Liability would be based upon the agency
theory of respondeat superior. Under this theory, the party must be
an agent of the municipal issuer106 and must violate an antifraud
provision while acting within the realm of the issuer's authority. 107
97. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See supra notes 91-96 and
accompanying text.
98. See Comment, Liability of Municipal Officialsfor Misrepresentations Concern-
ing Municipal Securities: Should the Corporate Standard be Applied?, 73 Nw. U.L.
REv. 137, 156 (1978). Other commentators, however, believe that a standard of reck-
lessness for involved officials would encourage honest investigation. See, e.g., Doty &
Petersen, supra note 2, at 370-89.
99. Note, supra note 47, at 1286.
100. Id. at 1288.
101. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aft'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert,
denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
102. 259 F. Supp. at 681-82, 684. See generally Note, supra note 20, at 717-22.
103. 425 U.S. 185 (1975).
104. Id. at 193.
105. For a general discussion of the municipality as a principal, see supra text
accompanying notes 71-79.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1.1 (1957) provides: "Agency is the
fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to
another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent
by the other so to act."
107. Id § 161.
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Additionally, the culpable conduct must occur while the agent was
performing his duties'08 for the issuer. 1°9 Shores v. Sklar," 0 an ac-
tion against an industrial development bond counselor, lends itself
well to respondeat superior analysis.
In Shores, the bond counselor violated section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5
by misstating numerous facts in an offering circular."' The bor-
rower, unable to fulfill its lease obligation, defaulted on debt service.
The guarantors' assets similarly were unable to provide debt serv-
ice." 2 Plaintiff, because he had not read the circular, sued Sklar on a
fraud-on-the-market theory" 13 to establish the proximate cause of his
injury." 4 Plaintiff's argument, which the court upheld, was that but
for the circular's omissions and inaccuracies, the IDB's would not
have been marketable." I
The Shores rationale arguably could be extended. Under it, a
plaintiff might allege that the bond counselor prepared the offering
brochure under the issuer's authority and that preparation of the
brochure was a normative duty the counselor owed the municipal-
ity. 116 Consequently, an agency relationship arose. The municipal-
ity, therefore, would be vicariously liable for its agent's antifraud
violations.
Imposition of vicarious liability upon a municipality for the fraud-
ulent conduct of another issuing party is problematic. Respondeat
superior recovery would depend on the advocate's ability to prove
that the issuer in fact "controlled" the actual perpetrator.'1 7 Success
108. ld. §§ 258, 261.
109. See id. § 257.
110. 610 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1980).
111 Id. at 237-38. Specifically, plaintiff accused the bond counselor of failing to
disclose that the principal construction firm was defending several suits and that the
firm made improper payments to the borrower to obtain the contract. Id. at 238.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 239.
114. Id. The fraud-on-the-market theory relies on the market to utilize all avail-
able information to establish the security's price. As the market relies on the avail-
able information misrepresentations or omissions can affect the price selected for an
individual security. Id. at 240.
115. Id. at 239.
116. Eg., Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Decv. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla.
1976) (investor suit against the law firms retained by the municipality to draft IDB
legality opinion).
117. One pragmatic argument in support of this notion is that in many jurisdic-
tions, the issuing authority decides who is qualified to serve as the borrower's bond
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of this argument normally occurs in the employer-employee con-
text. ' 18 With an industrial development bond, however, there is com-
paratively little nexus between the offering parties, unless conspiracy
and aiding and abetting liability can be shown. It is doubtful there-
fore that a court would accept the "control" argument to impose vica-
rious liability on an issuing municipality.' 19 Furthermore, it makes
counsel. Interview with the Executive Director of the St. Louis County Development
Authority, in St. Louis, Missouri (Sept. 23, 1981).
The Securities Act of 1933 and the 1934 Exchange Act codify a limited version of
the common law doctrine of respondeat superior. Section 20(a), the "controlling per-
son" provision of the 1934 Act, provides as follows:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person
to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling
person acted in goodfaith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts
constituting the violation or cause of action.
15 U.S.C. § 78t (1976) (emphasis added). Courts and commentators differ on whether
section 20(a), in the securities context, expands or supplants the respondeat superior
doctrine. Given the good faith defense that the section provides, one can forcefully
argue that it displaces the strict liability common law concept. Eg., Kamen & Co. v.
Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689, 696-700, (9th Cir. 1967) (section 20(a), not
respondeat superior, controls vicarious liability), cert. granted, 390 U.S. 942 (1968),
cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1969); Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 168 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (action against corporate president for sale of stock through fraudulent misrep-
resentations, Section 20(a) controls); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1063
(S.D.N.Y.. 1973) (statutory good faith and not respondeat superior is the standard to
determine liability of a broker for actions by an employee).
Some courts, however, believe that section 20(a) expands the respondeat superior
doctrine. E.g., Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 712 (2d Cir. 1980)
(employee's misrepresentation about status as investment analyst held actionable
against brokerage); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir.
1978) (broker liable for an employee's mishandling of an investment portfolio); Hol-
loway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 694-95 (6th Cir. 1976) (brokerage firm liable if in-
vestors do not know that the employee is acting outside of the firm).
Whether section 20(a) expands or restricts the doctrine of respondeat superior, it
would nevertheless be improbable for a court to conclude that a municipality met the
20(a) standard of control for all of the parties in an IDB issuance. See Zweig v.
Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1975) (action against publisher for
financial columnist's incorrect evaluation of company, good faith defense shown).
For an excellent discussion of section 20(a) liability, see Note, The Burden of Control
Derivative Liability under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1019, 1021-25 (1973) (control can only be shown where the allegedly
controlling person has actual control over the activities or entity which the principal
perpetrator operated).
118. See supra note 117.
119. One court, in dictum, advocated issuer liability when plaintiff sued bond
counsel but did not join the municipality. SEC v. Haswell, [1977 Transfer Binder]
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little sense to require proof of "scienter"' 2 ° for principal and aiding
and abetting antifraud liability121 while allowing a strict liability
standard in respondeat superior cases.
Holding municipal issuers liable for negligent misstatements or
under a respondeat superior standard would be a disservice to the
general public. Law that would subject issuers to securities fraud lia-
bility for less than "intentional or knowing" misrepresentations could
deter creative municipal finance programs and public service activi-
ties.122 This would not be a wise policy choice and would do little to
advance IDB investor protection.' 23
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
An industrial development bond institutional or individual inves-
tor'24 must have comprehensive, accurate and independently verified
data about the bond issue and its offering parties.' 25 Debate arises,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,156 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (issuing authority might be
liable if bond counsel's limited involvement precluded antifraud liability).
See also In re Walston & Co. and Harrington, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,474 (1967), where an affirmative duty was placed on a bro-
kerage to investigate a promoter's ability to service real estate bonds. Id. at 82,944-45.
This duty arguably could be extended to a municipality to determine whether all
offering parties are of the integrity to prevent an antifraud violation. See generally
Sykes, supra note 3, at 233.
120. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
121. See supra notes 69-104 and accompanying text.
122. Note, supra note 47, at 1286. At least two commentators believe that munici-
pal officials should be immune from liability unless the aggrieved party can prove
"active fraud on the official's part." Id. at 1288. See Comment, supra note 98, at 156.
Any other policy would deter "efficient, unencumbered government." Id. at 153. See
also Glazer, Is the Litigation Explosion Goodfor the U.S.?, Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1981,
at 26, col. 5 (Book Review of J. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY).
123. See generally Note, supra note 47, at 1286.
124. A great many IDB's are privately placed. With such issues, there are usually
restrictions on bond sales to individuals. The institutional investor can usually sell
part of an issue to another financial institution. This is tantamount to "participation
lending" in the commercial banking context. Interview with the Executive Director
of the St. Louis County Development Authority, in St. Louis, Missouri (Sept. 23,
1981). An institutional investor in a private placement would therefore treat the in-
vestment like a commercial loan and use many established investigative procedures.
Id See L. MOAK & A. HILLHOUSE, CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES IN LOCAL GovERN-
MENT FINANCE 326 (1975).
125. Hellige, Industrial Development Bonds: The Disclosure Dilemma, 6 J. CORP.
L. 291, 297 (1981).
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however, about the feasibility of proposed disclosure measures.
1 26
Initially, the SEC and various senators proposed federal legislation
that would subject IDB's to the full registration and reporting re-
quirements of the federal securities laws.'27 This legislation, how-
ever, would result in enormous administrative costs at the federal and
local levels.'2 8
Another proposal places the issuing, investigative and review pro-
cedures upon state securities commissions. 129 Given current state
fiscal pressures and the difficulty of monitoring hundreds of bond is-
sues in a particular area, states would probably not accept this
task.1
30
126. Id. at 3 10. See generally Currier, Mandating Disclosures in Municipal Securi-
ties Issues: Proposed New York Legislation, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 67, 78 (1979).
127. The SEC proposed Rule 131 under the Securities Act of 1933 and Rule 3b-5
under the Exchange Act of 1934, which were adopted in 1968. Securities Act Release
No. 4921 and Exchange Act Release No. 8388 [1968 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 77,592 (1968). For a discussion of these acts, see Note, supra note 36.
Senator Eagleton sponsored S. 2574, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 33907
(1975), which required industrial development bonds to comply with the same regis-
tration and disclosure procedures as corporate securities. Senators Proxmire, Wil-
liams and Javits sponsored S. 2339, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONo. REC. 38236
(1977), which required limited disclosure from industrial development bond issuers.
The SEC, in 1978, introduced the Industrial Development Bond Act to obtain disclo-
sure from IDB offerors. S. 3323, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CoNG. REc. 21632 (1978).
This Act places an IDB borrower into alignment with a corporate securities issuer. It
defines "issuer' as the enterprise which is receiving bond proceeds and is not respon-
sible for its repayment. By amending section 2(4) and section 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act,
requiring securities registration, the Industrial Development Bond Act,if enacted,
would subject IDB's to the 1933 Act and the 1934 Exchange Act registration and
reporting provisions. See Currier, supra note 126, at 84.
128. Due to the large underwriting and legal fees registration entails, the Eagleton
bill, S. 2574, contravenes cost efficiencies associated with IDB financing. It would
also greatly increase the SEC's workload. This measure, therefore, received little sup-
port. The disclosure sought by the Proxmire bill, S. 2339, focused on the municipal
issuer, rather than the corporate borrower. Because the borrower is ultimately obli-
gated to repay the IDB, this proposal was also inappropriate to meet investors' needs.
Hellige, supra note 125, at 310-13. The SEC proposal, S. 3323, has the same cost
disadvantage as the Eagleton bill.
129. Note, supra note 20, at 724. The author suggests that states pledge their full
faith and credit as a guaranty of payment in the event of IDB default. Id. It is doubt-
ful, however, that states would expose themselves to such liability.
130. Some states, for example Oklahoma, Mississippi, Kentucky, Pennsylvania,
Massachsetts, Connecticut and California, have established state industrial develop-
ment authorities. See Note, supra note 20, at 708. If such states are willing to accept
the administrative task of issuing IDB's, arguably they could implement state securi-
ties laws to regulate IDB disclosure and reporting.
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A third method to increase investor protection and to reduce mu-
nicipal liability would place the onus on the issuer."' Other than the
borrower, the municipality is the primary beneficiary of the IDB 132
and, with the trustee, is in the best position to oversee a particular
bond issue.' 33 A municipal investigation would focus upon the
financial stability and business integrity of the corporate borrower,
134
the party actually accountable for debt service. 13  While municipali-
ties currently assess the borrower's financial position, the degree and
thoroughness of these assessments vary widely. To promote uniform-
ity, independent auditors 36 could be utilized to analyze completely
the past and present financial status of the borrower. 137 Industry
forecasts and product market conditions could be qualitatively and
quantitatively evaluated. Management plans and objectives for fu-
ture corporate revenues and earnings could be realistically assessed
to determine whether the obligors will fulfill their borrowing respon-
sibilities.'38 This information, in all IDB issues, would be compiled
131. Interview with Spokesman from Goldman, Sachs & Co., in St. Louis, Mis-
souri (Feb. 12, 1981). This proposal is apparently supported by the brokerage indus-
try and some issuing authorities. Id. Interview with the Executive Director of the St.
Louis County Development Authority, in St. Louis, Missouri (Sept. 23, 1981).
132. GOODBODY & Co., supra note 9, at 39-40; Currier, supra note 126, at 78. See
supra note 4.
133. The municipality, as the issuer, should be in close contact with the offering
parties, Interview with spokesman from Goldman, Sachs & Co., in St. Louis,
Misssouri (Feb. 12 1981).
134. Note, supra note 36, at 401.
135. See Hellige, supra note 125, at 314. Additionally, proper investigation war-
rants a review of the bond underwriters and brokers. This is partially accomplished
by the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, a creation of the 1975 Exchange Act
Amendment. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(1) (1976). See supra notes 43-44.
At least two commentators believe that in municipal general obligation offerings,
underwriters, brokers, bond counsel, accountants and the issuer should investigate
each other to provide appropriate public disclosure. Doty & Petersen, supra note 2, at
389.
136. The larger issuing authorities tend to conduct their own, independent bor-
rower evaluation. Interview with the Executive Director of the St. Louis County De-
velopment Authority, in St. Louis, Missouri (Sept. 23, 1981).
137. This evaluation should encompass a five-year survey of assets, liabilities,
debt structure, return on investment, return on assets and annual changes in financial
position. There also should be a continual review of problems involving litigation,
arbitration and labor relations. See generally Casey & Smith, supra note 3, at 645
n.22.
138. The Securities and Exchange Commission, subject to "safe-harbor" guide-
lines set forth in Rules 175 and 3b-6, allows corporate projections of revenues, earn-
1983]
Washington University Open Scholarship
212 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 24:193
in a comprehensive offering memorandum with an accuracy endorse-
ment by all offering parties.' 3 9 Finally, periodic reviews and report-
ing would continue while the bond remained outstanding.
Indications of borrower insolvency should prompt the issuer, and
particularly the trustee, to attempt to reduce the likelihood of default.
This could be accomplished by accelerating all payments due under
the bond or restructuring the borrower's financial and operational
position. All such efforts should ultimately enable the borrower to
satisfy timely the debt obligation. 14
0
VI. CONCLUSION
Soaring interest rates motivate corporations to seek tax-exempt
financing. Urban unemployment and suburban population growth
intensify municipal efforts of industrial inducement. These factors
lead to increased IDB use. Congress, by exempting tax-exempt in-
dustrial development bonds from SEC registration and reporting,
placed the responsibility for regulation on local authorities. Munici-
palities must therefore act to reduce their liability and to protect their
citizens who invest on IDB's. Certainly, an industrial development
bond purchaser merits the same protections afforded a corporate se-
curities investor.' 41
ings and overall growth. D. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION: MATERIALS FOR A
BASIC COURSE 724 (2nd ed. 1980).
Market factors, such as industry position and competition, should be evaluated.
Company operational variables, such as order backlog, supply and demand segment
dependence and seasonal variations, should be investigated. Note, supra note 36, at
407.
139. This is in effect a "red-herring Preliminary Official Statement." This state-
ment is admittedly a comprehensive document; its information should be disclosed
equally to institutional and individual investors. Interview with the Executive Direc-
tor of the St. Louis County Development Authority, in St. Louis, Missouri (Sept. 23,
1981).
140. Periodic reporting to the issuer would allow immediate remedial action
should the parties discover the borrower's financial difficulties. Certainly a debt re-
structuring or a management overhaul is preferable to complete default. Id. Admit-
tedly, elected officials have time and skill constraints on their ability to reevaluate the
borrower. In most issuing municipalities, members of the bond authority are fully
occupied by their primary professions. This mandates expert independent review.
See Note, supra note 47, at 1286-87.
141. See Note, supra note 36, at 410.
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